Who does what
The protocol pages describe machinery. This page describes the people it asks something of. If any row of this page is unrealistic, the machinery does not matter.
The producer — agricultor, chacarero
| Gains | Makes the certified claim in their own name, and is paid a share that is visible to the buyer. Can sell certified to any participating stall without renegotiating who gets to say "organic". |
|---|---|
| Does | Holds a signing key. Registers lots before market day: crop, weight, farmgate price. Presents a QR at the point of sale. |
| New burden | Real. Weighing and registering lots is work that was previously informal. Key custody is a genuine risk. A producer with 40 kg of oca does not have an ops team. |
| Fails if | Registration takes more than a couple of minutes per lot, or requires signal at the chacra, or the phone breaks and the certification goes with it. |
The design consequence: lot registration has to work offline and take under 90 seconds, and re-attestation after key loss has to be a phone call to the council, not a re-audit. If we cannot hit those, the rest is a paper exercise. A producer association or market-day host can run the merchant backend on the producer's behalf — Taler's instance model allows exactly that without the host holding the signing key.
The certifier — organismo de certificación, or SGP council
| Gains | Its decisions become verifiable outside the room. An SGP council's peer audit currently stops at the edge of its region; signed, it reaches any shopper in the country. Enforcement against overselling becomes automatic instead of annual. |
|---|---|
| Does | Signs attestations to producer keys. Sets and issues a season quota from the audited yield estimate. Publishes revocations. Handles key rotation when a producer loses a phone. |
| New burden | Operating signing infrastructure — modest, but non-zero, and an SGP council is volunteers and a regional coordinator, not an IT department. The yield estimate becomes a number with consequences, which changes how carefully it must be made. |
| Fails if | Supplementary issuance after a good harvest is slow. Producers will route around the system rather than leave a crop unsold, and they will be right to. |
Not the certification companies. Ley 30983 made the SGP a legally sufficient certifier for small producers on the domestic market[1], and four are registered with SENASA[2]. They are cheap enough for smallholders to reach and their output is currently invisible beyond their own region. That combination — legitimate, affordable, illegible at distance — is exactly the shape of problem a signature solves.
The distributor — puesto de mercado, bodega, transportista
| Gains | A claim they can substantiate rather than assert. Liability for the organic claim rests with the producer who signed it. A stall that carries verifiable produce has something a neighbouring stall does not. |
|---|---|
| Does | Countersigns with its own key, declaring its commission as a line item. Displays the QR. Settles its declared share. |
| New burden | Discloses its margin. This is the ask, and it is not small. It is also the only part of the design that a participant might reasonably refuse on principle. |
| Fails if | Enough shoppers do not care that disclosure carries no upside, in which case the stall takes on cost and exposure for nothing. |
We should be straight about this: the distributor is the party this project asks the most of and offers the least to. "Flipping it on its head" is accurate, and the party currently at the top of the head is the retailer.
The honest case to a market vendor is not moral, it is competitive. A stall whose organic claim is checkable in the buyer's hand can charge the premium and keep it, while the stall next door with a photocopied certificate cannot. The disclosed commission is the price of access to a claim that actually holds up. Whether that trade reads as attractive at 6 a.m. in a Peruvian market is an empirical question, and it is OQ-6 — arguably the one that decides the project.
The shopper — consumidor
| Gains | Certainty instead of a sign. Sees where the money goes. Is not tracked for having bought it. |
|---|---|
| Does | Scans a QR. That is the entire ask, and it must stay that way. |
| New burden | Installing a wallet — which is a large ask in a country with no Taler installed base, and the project's biggest adoption risk. |
| Fails if | The result is a green tick. A tick is a brand, and this project exists because brands captured the claim. The wallet must show a sentence: what standard, issued by whom, valid until when, covering which crop. |
And it must be equally clear when verification fails, and specific about why: unrecognised issuer, expired attestation, wrong crop, stale registry mirror. Ambiguity here is worse than no wallet at all, because it teaches people to ignore the warning.
SENASA
| Gains | Its registry becomes the live root of trust for domestic organic commerce. Suspending a body has immediate effect at the point of sale rather than propagating through paperwork over months. |
|---|---|
| Does | Nothing, initially. The project mirrors and signs the registry SENASA already publishes[2]. Participation is not required for the pilot. |
| Ideal end state | SENASA publishes the registry in a signed, machine-readable form and our mirror is deleted. A private mirror of a public registry is a liability we are carrying temporarily, not a position we want. |
agro.yaya.cash
| Does | Publishes the specification, the registry mirror, and reference implementations of the producer instance, the countersigning terminal and the wallet verification library. |
|---|---|
| Never does | Sits in the transaction path. Holds producer keys. Decides who may certify. Aggregates or sells transaction data — see the design rule. |
| Sustainability | open Unresolved. Every obvious revenue model — per-transaction fees, data, certification-as-a-service — conflicts with one of the lines above. OQ-7. Stating this openly is better than a business model that quietly contradicts the design. |
See also: Protocol overview · Pilot & roadmap · Where the money goes
References
- Ley N° 30983. El Peruano
- SENASA registry of certification bodies and SGPs. gob.pe